An Orthodoxy That May Be

Never one to give a definitive answer, Derrida answered the question of his religion with the coy statement that he quite rightly past for an atheist, an answer that kept the question open and hinted at the insufficiency of categories of religion such as theist/atheist.   Derrida’s deconstruction aimed to make us aware of the functions of exclusion inherent in the categories of language.  Derrida’s answer to the religion question suggests that he thought the theist/atheist binary excluded, at the very least, him.  The label agnostic didn’t fit him either.  His “religious” views eluded our classifications and categorizations. 

 

Echoing Derrida, Jon Stanley argues in The Other Journal that every Christian should quite rightly pass for an atheist, but the atheism he has in mind is not the rejection of God, but a rejection of the “idols of our time” such as nationalism, technologism, and economism: the pursuit of national interest, technology, and wealth all at any cost.  The sense of atheist he thinks Christians should don is that of the term as applied to the early Christians by the Roman Empire.  

 

Taking his argument a step further, Stanley offers a “subtle and suggestive Christian credo” of his own:

 

Am I an atheist? Well, if that means one who no longer desires God and testifies to the reality of God in my life, and one who has given up on the hope of the name of God and the naming of God being significant for human life, then, “No, I am not an atheist.” But if that means one who is suspicious of the gods of our age (as the idols of our time), and sensitive to the way in which our submission to them leads to injustice and makes life on earth a “living hell” for many, then, “Yes, I quite rightly pass for an atheist.”

And am I a theist? Well, if that means feeling the need to subscribe to the theological doctrines and moral conventions that go by the name “orthodoxy,” and if historically any “theism” (particularly “classical theism”) has always been some form of “deism” (the belief in a distant, dispassionate, and authoritarian supreme being), then, “No, I am not a theist.” But if it refers to the wholehearted allegiance to God and God’s good creation, and if this translates into a desire for God that is simultaneously a desire for justice, and a love of God that is simultaneously a love of neighbor, then, “Yes, I quite rightly pass for a theist.”

 

Stanley rejects a type of theism marked by a subscription to the theological doctrines and moral conventions that go by the name “orthodoxy,” but he doesn’t articulate why or explain whether he sees this subscription as idolatry akin to nationalism, technologism, and economism.  He condemned those idolatries to the extent that they pursue their valued object “at any cost.”  Does subscription to orthodoxy imply a belief at any cost?  I don’t see why that would be.

 

I suspect rather that Stanley’s rejection stems from the deconstructionist policy of keeping us open to what our formulas exclude.  Orthodoxy obviously excludes the heterodox.  A right way of thinking excludes what it holds as wrong ways of thinking.  Deconstruction would seem to be anti-orthodoxy in that claims to orthodoxy exclude a great deal and often with much passion, and sometimes with much violence.  Besides, claims to speak for God, especially by the powerful, probably should raise red flags.  The propositions of orthodoxy may exclude what they have no right to exclude, and those who claim their religion as the one, true, orthodox religion may violate more than the right to freedom of religion in their defense of the official creed.

 

John D. Caputo, to whom Stanley is much indebted, also rejected the idea of there being one, true, orthodox religion.  “We may and need to have many religions, and many ‘sacred scriptures,’ to long as all of them are true,” Caputo wrote in his book On Religion.[i]  I wouldn’t call this relativism in religion, as Caputo has a standard by which to judge religious practices and claims of religious truth – the love of God – but I think Caputo himself, in his interest in including what “orthodoxy” excludes, excludes a possible religious truth.  He claims that religious truth “does not have to do with approved propositions,”[ii] but offers no evidence against the possibility of there being human propositions approved by God, or that these approved propositions might help guide the love of God towards God and away from idols and other false deities. 

 

According to Caputo, religions are artifacts or historical constructions that articulate the love of God.[iii]  They are “instituted by God” only in the sense that “the various religious forms of life arise in response to something that has swept us away…” He sees God as a question and not as an answer, but is it impossible that God may be both?

 

By excluding orthodoxy from the “theism” or “religious truth” they defend, Stanley and Caputo exclude the possibility that God has instituted a particular religious response to his revelation and has given his guidance to that religion in its formulas.  Excluding such a possibility would seem to run counter to the spirit of deconstruction.  Deconstructionists should, in the name of justice, open claims of orthodoxy to what they exclude, but, in being consistent deconstructionists, they should also remain open to an orthodoxy that may be.

 

H/T: The Church and Postmodern Culture

  

 

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[i] John Caputo, On Religion (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), 110.

[ii] Caputo, 112.

[iii] Caputo, 112.